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Umut TURKSEN & Ruth HOLDER*
‘Fairness and equality tend to be in the eye of the beholder, especially when commercial interests are
at stake’
This article focuses on the issue of enforcement of the WTO rules on international cross-border
trade in services. It is argued that the examination of the GATS jurisprudence and state practice
reveal that the GATS does not address the needs of the developing countries in general and the
prospects of internet gambling services in the Caribbean Community in particular. First, the
article discusses the extent of service-producing activities within the GATS provisions and
outlines the main principles of WTO. It stresses that ‘services’ include gambling and games
provided online. It also asserts that cross-border trade in services via Information and
Communication Technologies presents several challenges for policy makers including enforcement,
control and accountability. Second, the article critically analyses the United States (US) domestic
legal instruments, which led to the complaint by Antigua and Barbuda. Subsequently, the focus is
shifted to the critique of the judgments by WTO dispute settlement bodies. Third, the article
evaluates the effectiveness of the DSU from a legal redress and compliance point of view,
particularly in instances where weaker economies as complainants challenge leading economies of
the world.
1 INTRODUCTION
The growth of the service sector within the last two decades resulted in increased
economic activity across borders with concomitant regulation being sought in
international trade.
The notion of trade in services was a novelty for the negotiators in the
Uruguay Round, hence the use of GATT principles in the development of
the core principles for a trade in services agreement (GATS). However, the
liberalization of trade in services is significantly different from that of goods due to
the intrinsic nature of services and as such, the application of border controls
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cannot be physically implemented, thus the regulatory provisions of the services
agreement.
The shadow of GATT is therefore ubiquitous in the GATS and is most visible
in the non-discrimination provisions, market access, domestic regulation, most
favoured nation treatment and national treatment, conversely the distinction has
addressed various legislative issues.
The World Trade Organization1 (WTO) adjudicates trade disputes pursuant
to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).2 Antigua and Barbuda3 became
the smallest developing country member4 to challenge the United States of
America (US)5 in the regulation of remote supply of cross-border gambling and
betting services6 in the first and most prominent internet gambling case7 with a
degree of success.
Whilst the WTO is based on equal treatment and non-discrimination8
principles and provides a ‘rules based’ dispute settlement mechanism,9 there are
still shortcomings in securing justice, remedies and compliance. With more
potential cases involving fair competition for small economies on the horizon,10
this article critically analyses the inherent and current problems facing vulnerable
economies in the context of the GATS. It is argued that GATS has not been as
effective as it had been envisaged twenty years ago owing to problems such as
1 The World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
15 Apr. 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154, 33 I.L.M.1144 (1994).
2 Understanding the Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, 15 Apr. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instrument.
3 Antigua and Barbuda has been a WTO member since 1 Jan. 1995. Antigua and Barbuda is a small,
twin island nation on the eastern edge of the Caribbean Sea. Being small and suffering the
consequences of hundreds of years of colonialism, deforestation by the former colonial power and
the inability to compete in the global agricultural markets, it had to turn to alternative ways of
developing the economy and providing livelihoods for its people: Alongside tourism, internet
gambling has been one of the blood line of its economy in the last decade.
4 WTO classification, ‘small vulnerable economy (SVEs) NAMA’.
5 Unites States – Measures affecting the Cross Border supply of Gambling and Betting services
WT/DS285/AB/R (8 Oct. 2003).
6 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285 (10 Nov. 2004).
7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Internet Gambling: an overview of the issue, Publication No.
GAO 03-89 (2002).
8 GATS, Art. XVII.
9 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, 15 Apr. 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WTO Charter – Annex 2, Art.
1[hereinafter DSU].
10 For example, internet-based services (sales, financial products, etc.) are increasingly provided from
small jurisdictions. In the early 90s, when WTO Members were finalizing their Schedules of
Commitments, Internet was viewed as just another services sector rather than a mode of supply in
itself through which virtually all services can be supplied. Delimatsis P., Protecting Public Morals in a
Digital Age: Revisiting the WTO Rulings on US – Gambling and China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products, 14 J Intl. Econ. L. 257 (2011).
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uncertain definitions and scope of sectors within the schedule of commitments of
Member States.
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Uruguay Round11 of negotiations resulted in the establishment of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)12 to enhance the regulation of
trade in services.13
The GATS is a complex agreement comprising of general obligations with
narrow exceptions applicable to specific commitments in the respective service
sectors of the Member countries. The general obligations are applicable and
binding on all Members, whereas specific commitments relate to the individual
Member States.
The GATS provides four ‘modes’14 of supply of services:
– cross-border supply;15
– consumption abroad;16
– commercial presence;17 and
– the presence of natural persons.18
The discussion here revolves around the provisions of the first modality of
cross-border supply which ‘covers service flows from the territory of one Member
into the territory of another Member’.19 The significance of this mode is analysed
with reference to the US-Gambling dispute20 whereby the DSB confirmed the
application of GATS rules to e-commerce and electronically supplied services and
reviewed the public morals exception under Article XIV(a) GATS.
In order to fulfil the mandate of these modalities, Members either make
horizontal or specific commitments or no commitment to a sector. Horizontal and
specific commitments are subject to various conditions and limitations on market
access and qualifications on national treatment. Being reciprocal to the specific
11 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, 1994.
12 General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
13 Bigos BJ, Contemplating GATS Art. XVIII on Additional Commitments, 42 J.World Trade, 723 (2008).
14 GATS Art. I.2.
15 GATS Art. I.2 (a).
16 GATS Art. I.2 (b).
17 GATS Art. I.2 (c).
18 GATS Art. I.2 (d).
19 GATS Art. I.2.
20 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R, 10 Nov. 2004.
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sector, the Members agree not to impede market access by the imposition of any
quotas or prohibitions and non-discrimination against foreign providers.21 These
commitments are based on an independent classification of activities developed on
the United Nations (UN) Central Product Classification (CPC).22 The barriers to
trade in services are regulatory23 and are intra-territorial, thus the liberalization of
services entails restriction of domestic regulation.
Resulting from this and identified in the Framework Agreement of Protocols
and Members Schedules of Specific Commitments in Services (‘Schedule’),24 are
the general obligations and specific commitments. General obligations require
Members to: ‘accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service
suppliers of any Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like
services and services suppliers of any other country’.25
On the other hand, specific obligations only apply to the extent that a
Member has a specific undertaking in accordance with the Schedule.26 While the
GATS aims to enhance international trade liberalization,27 it recognizes the rights
of Member to regulate services to meet national policy objectives.28
There have only been four cases involving the GATS29 and as such, there was
not a dearth of case law that neither the panel nor Appellate Body (AB) could
have referred to in the US-Gambling case.30 Previously, Part III of the GATS was
not challenged. Accordingly, discussion here focus on the regulatory framework
relating to the market access (e.g., Article XVI of the GATS), national treatment
21 Mattoo A & Wunsch S, Preempting Protectionism in Services:The GATS and Outsourcing (2004).
22 WTO, Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Services, Services Sectoral Classification List.
MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 Jul. 1991 and United Nations, Services Sectoral Classification List Central
Product Classification (CPC) MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 Jul. 1991).
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_gns_w_120_e.doc. Lester S, Mercurio B &
Davies A, World trade Law: Texts, Materials and Commentary (2d ed., Oxford & Portland Oregon
2012) defines CPC as a detailed multi-level classification of goods and services which is ex-
haustive and its categories are mutually exclusive.
23 Pauwelyn J, Remedies in the WTO: First Set the Goal, Then Fix the Instruments to Get There, in WTO
Law and Process (Mads Andenas & Federico Ortino eds, Brit. Inst. Intl. & Comp. L. 2005).
24 WTO, Uruguay Round, Group of Negotiations on Services, Services Sectoral Classification List,
MTN.GNS/W/120/ 10 Jul. 1991 and United Nations, Services Sectoral Classification List Central
Product Classification (CPC) MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 Jul. 1991).
25 GATS Art. II.1.
26 Bigos BJ, Contemplating GATS Article XVIII on Additional Commitments, 42 J.World Trade (2008).
27 Murin N, The GATS: a Legal Perspective on Crossroads of Conflicting Interest, 10 World Trade Rev.
(2011).
28 GATS Art. XIV.
29 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 14 Mar. 1997, WT/DS31/R; European
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas WT/DS27, Canada
– Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, (AB-2000-2) Report of the Appellate
Body, 31 May 2000; United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services (WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R of 7 Apr. 2005).
30 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285.
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obligations (Article XVII of the GATS), certain provisions of domestic regulations
detailing the procedural and substantive obligations (Article VI of the GATS) and
the additional commitments (Article XVIII of the GATS).
Contentious interpretative issues pertaining to the balance between trade
constraints and the autonomy of Member service regulators are also analysed.31
Furthermore, inter-linkages between market access and national treatment
obligations32 and those of domestic regulations which have not been clearly
established by the provisions of GATS33 are addressed.
Article XVI GATS stipulates six prohibited market access restrictions for
services. Conversely, domestic regulations affecting the supply of services are
permitted if they are non-discriminatory.34 The complaint based on Article XVI
GATS relates to whether or not the US had undertaken market access
commitment in the GATS Schedule with regard to gambling and betting
services.35
Owing to the intrinsic nature and the variety of methods which can be
employed to conduct services,36 the GATS obligations to grant market access and
national treatment only apply with respect to those service sectors and modes of
supply which a particular WTO Member chooses to bind in its schedules of
specific commitments on liberalization on trade in services.37
The US-Gambling dispute relates to the national treatment principle. The
EC-Bananas III38 case developed a four-pronged test to establish inconsistency of a
particular measure with Article XVII GATS by examining the elements must be
presented cumulatively.39 Article XVII.2 GATS states that not only de jure but
also de facto discrimination is covered by national treatment obligation.
To ensure effective dispute resolution under the GATS Agreement, Articles
XXII and XXIII GATS provide the framework for consultations and dispute
settlement.Whilst there are no strict stare decisis mandates in theWTO,40 reliance is
placed upon previously decided cases and the interpretative rules of international
31 Leroux EH, Eleven Years of GATS Case Law:What have we Learned? 10 J. Intl. Econ. L. 749 (2007).
32 GATS Arts XVI and XVII.
33 GATS Arts VXI, XVII, XVI.4 and XVI.5.
34 GATS Art. XVII and Pauwelyn J, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules –
towards a More Collective Approach, 94 Am. J. Intl. L. 335 (2000).
35 Ortino F, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body report in US-Gambling: A Critique, 9 J.
Intl. Econ. L. 117 (2006).
36 Marchetti JA & Mavroids PC, What Are the Main Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk
about Revolution, 5 European Bus. Org. L. Rev. 548 (2008).
37 Zdouc W, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATS, 2 J. Intl Econ. L. 295 (1999).
38 EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Docs WT/DS27/R 7
WT/DS27/AB/R of 25 Sep. 1997 (EC-Bananas III).
39 Matsushita M, Schoenbaum TJ & Mavroids PC, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and
Policy 662 (Oxford U. Press 2006).
40 Bissett C, All Bets Are Off(Line): Antigua’s Trouble in a Virtual Paradise, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L.
Rev. 367 (2004).
THE GATS AND INTERNET GAMBLING 461
law with the primary goal of bringing about compliance41 within a reasonable
period of time.42
The recommendations of the DSB are declaratory and aggrieved party may
resort to compensation so as to mitigate the loss suffered or retaliate in order to
persuade the respondent party comply with the ruling.43 The DSB authorized
retaliatory measures, which proved to be ineffective44 in cases such as the
EC-Bananas45 and the EC-Hormones.46 In the US-Gambling case,47 Antigua
requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations under the
GATS and TRIPS48 Agreements which was granted on 28 January 2013.49 It was
argued that retaliation would have a disproportionate adverse impact and would be
vastly inadequate to recoup the losses incurred.50 The differential in this case
vis-à-vis the two previous cases is the economic disparity between the US and
Antigua. Despite not being a condition for cross-retaliation, the arbitrator
reasonably determined that the circumstances were serious enough51 to warrant
such concessions.A similar approach was taken in US – Upland Cotton.52 In both
instances the countries followed the hierarchy of procedures and remedies to
establish the effectiveness of the sector and agreement for the suspension of
concessions.
Whilst it purports to provide equality and a level playing field in an impartial
forum; the DSU does not provide a structured way to achieve negotiated
settlements.53 This notion has been tested by the US-Gambling case.
Despite the legal framework of the DSU rules and procedures for the
immediate settlement of disputes, small economies experience difficulties in the
enforcement of the decisions of the WTO DSB. Therefore, the lack of clarity54
arising from the GATS is one of most profound areas of dissatisfaction.
41 Supra note 34, Pauwelyn, 335.
42 DSU Art. 22(2).
43 DSU Art. 2(1), (2) and (3).
44 Darling JB, Gambling with Our Future: A Call for Needed WTO Dispute Resolution Reform as
Illustrated by the US- Antigua Conflict Over Online Gambling 42 George Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 381
(2010).
45 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas,WT/DS27/AB/R (9 Sep. 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas].
46 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones),WT/DS26/AB/R,WT/DS48/AB/R (16 Jan. 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones].
47 Recourse to Art. 22.6 DSU.
48 TRIPS.
49 Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Art. 22.2 of the DSU,WT/DS/285/22, dated 22 Jun. 2007.
50 Van den Bossche quoting a passage from Bridges,Weekly Trade News Digest, 4 Jul. 2007.
51 DSU – Art. 22.3(c).
52 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,WT/DS267/EB/R.
53 Mitchell KMW, Developing Country Success in the WTO Disputes, 47 J.World Trade, 77 (2013).
54 Qureshi AH, Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspectives, (Cambridge U. Press 2006).
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1.2 US-GAMBLING DISPUTE
The economic crisis of the 1990s forced many developing countries to restructure
their economies in order to sustain growth. Countries, such as Antigua and
Barbuda traditionally reliant on tourism sought to diversify its service industry
with gambling and offshore banking as key variables.55 This in itself has brought
considerable economic change and controversy.56
The highly penetrable and lucrative online gambling industry57 led to the
licensing and taxing of this industry, which had been growing exponentially
particularly in Antigua.58 By the end of 1999, Antigua was hosting operations for
119 licensed internet gambling (IG) sites and provided the government with more
than USD 7.4 million in revenue which accounted for more than 10% of its
GDP.59 Prior to the introduction of the US Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act 2006 (UIGEA),60 the internet gambling industry was estimated
to be worth some USD 12 billion.61 Antigua was at the apex of the global IG
industry. Despite its growth, IG had not been widely accepted as a legitimate form
of entertainment by the U.S.62
Online gambling falls within the ambit of the GATS in accordance with the
CPC classification which lists ‘gambling and betting services’ under the
sub-category of ‘other recreational services’63 which WTO members use for the
interpretation of commitment categories.
In accordance with the preamble of the GATS, Members have the right to
regulate and to introduce new regulations on the supply of services in order to
meet national policy objectives. Nevertheless, this must not be done in an ad-hoc,
discriminatory or unilateral basis.
55 ‘Identity construction’ is an essential marketing device for business development. Las Vegas is,
perhaps, the best known example of this type of marketing strategy; thus Caribbean has
reconstructed itself not only as a tropical paradise but also centre for gambling, offshore banking,
etc.
56 Lapid K, Outsourcing and Offshoring Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 40 J. World
Trade 341 (2006).
57 Ross C., David Gambles to Slay the Goliath and Barely Lives to Tell the Tale: Antigua v. United States,
11 Gaming L. Rev. 674, 691 (2007).
58 Antigua Economic & Gambling Data, The Antigua-US WTO Dispute Over Internet Gambling,
http://www.antiguawto.com/WTOEconomicgamblingdata.html (citing Global Betting & Gaming
Consultants, Quarterly eGambling Statistics Report: May 2007 (accessed 19 Sep. 2014).
59 Ibid.
60 The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1952
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§5361–5367 (2006).
61 Casinocity, http://www.online.casinocity.com/jurisdictions (accessed 19 Sep. 2013).
62 Kilby M, The Mouse That Roared: Implications of the WTO Ruling in the US – Gambling, (2008) 44
Texas Intl. L.J., 236 (2008).
63 Matsushita M, Schoenbaum TJ & Mavroidis PC, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and
Policy 652 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed., 2006).
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In 2002, the US successfully brought a case against Jay Cohen,64 a US Citizen
residing in Antigua and operating an internet gambling business targeting US
citizens. The case65 resulted in the imprisonment of Cohen for taking bets
transmitted over wire in violation of the 1961 Wire Wager Act.66 Subsequently,
Antigua in an unprecedented manner challenged the US Federal and State laws,
which regulated the remote supply of cross-border gambling and betting services.
Antigua, without previous DSU experience was not daunted by the
procedural aspects in navigating the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS), whose
actions went against the grain of research findings put forward by commentators67
(which are predicated in light of disputes mainly pertaining to GATT) to prove
that developing countries:
– did not lack the required legal and technical expertise;
– there was no lack of domestic and especially financial resources for the
DSS; and
– there was no fear of political retaliation of an adverse ruling as in
essence.68
Previously, developing countries did not utilize the full economic benefits
which were available to them in the DSS as they were primarily underrepresented
and unable to compete at the same level as the developed countries owing to the
reasons above.69
Antigua requested consultation70 in March 2003. When the negotiations
produced no feasible solution71 Antigua invoked the DSU via the establishment of
64 United States v. Cohen, 260 F. 3d 68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2001) Cert. denied 122 S. Ct 2587 2002.
65 U.S. General Accounting Office, Internet Gambling: an overview of the issue, Publication No.
GAO 03-89 (2002).
66 Wire Wager Act 18 U. S.C. §1084(a) (2000).
67 Brown CP & Hoekman BM, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases:
Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. Intl. Econ. L. 861 (2005); Brown CP, Participation in WTO Dispute
Settlement Complaints, Interested Parties and Free Riders, 19 World Bank Econ. Rev. 287 (2005); Horn
H, Mavroidis PC, & NordstroEˇm, Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? in The
WTO and International Trade Law Dispute Settlement (Petros C. Mavroidis & Alan Sykes eds Edward
Elgar 2005); Bush ML, & Reinhardt E, Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 4
J. World Trade, 719 (2003); Davis CL & Bermeo, Who Flies? Developing Country Participation,
Adjudication, Princeton U. ms. (2006); Shaffer G, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for
Developing Country Adaptation, 5 World Trade Rev. 217 (2006); Staiger RW, What can developing
countries achieve in the WTO? Book review of Jawara Fatoumata and Aileen Kwa Behind the Scenes
at the WTO: the Real World of International Trade Negotiations 44 J. Econ. Literature 428 (2006).
68 For the strategies employed in this dispute see, Jackson S., Small States and Compliance Bargaining in
the wto: An Analysis of the Antigua–US Gambling Services Case, 25 Cambridge Rev. Intl. Aff.
367–385 (2012).
69 Brown CP & Hoekman BM, Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute
Settlement Is Not Enough, 42 J.World Trade, 177 (2008).
70 Article IX:2 of the GATS.
71 Darling JB, Gambling with Our Future: a Call for Needed WTO Dispute Resolution Reform as
Illustrated by the US-Antigua Conflict Over Online Gambling, 42 George Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 381
(2010).
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a panel alleging that several US legal instruments namely, the Wire Act 1961,72
The Travel Act 200673 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA) 200674
amounted to a total prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services and were therefore in violation of the US commitments under the
GATS.75 Additionally, these measures were inconsistent with the US obligations
under Articles II,VI, XVIII, XI, XVI and XVII and the annexed US Schedule of
specific commitments.
1.2[a] Summary of the Panel/AB Findings
Based on modified reasoning, the AB upheld the panel’s findings76 that the US
GATS Schedule included specific commitments on gambling and betting services
via its inclusion under theW/120 classification of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
as interpreted under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).77
The AB interpreted and concluded that this entry was within the scope of
‘gambling and betting services’.
Additionally, the panel’s decision was upheld that the US acted inconsistently
with Articles XVI:I and 2, as the US federal laws prohibited the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services where they had undertaken specific
commitments which amounted to a zero quota which fell within the scope and
prohibited by Article XVI:2(a) and (c). However, similar findings of Panel relating
to the state laws were reversed as Antigua did not make out a prima facie case78 in
respect to the state laws.
Regarding the third issue of general exceptions of GATS Article XIV(a), the
AB upheld the findings of the Panel that the US measures were designed ‘to
protect public morals or to maintain public order’ within the meaning of this
Article, but reversed the assertion that the US had not shown that its measures
were ‘necessary’ to do so because the Panel had erred in considering consultations
with Antigua to constitute a ‘reasonable available’ alternative measure. The AB
found the measures were necessary as the US had made a prima facie case showing
the ‘necessity’ whilst Antigua failed to identify any other measure that may have
72 The Wire Act 18 U.S.C. §1084 (2000).
73 The Travel Act 18 U.S.C. §1952 (a)–(b) (2000).
74 The Illegal Gambling Business Act 18 U.S.C. §1955 (2000).
75 Request for the establishment of a panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services D-2,WT/DS285/R (13 Jun.
2008).
76 Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services,WT/DS285/AB/R – 7 Apr. 2005.
77 VCLT Art. 32.
78 Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services WT/DS285/AB/R Adopted 7 Apr. 2005 ¶153–155, 257–263.
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been reasonably available. Regarding the Article XIV(c) defence, the AB reversed
the Panel’s erroneous ‘necessity’ analysis but decline to assert its own findings on
the matter. The rulings of the Panel and AB were subsequently adopted by the
DSB with the preferred remedy of withdrawal of the inconsistent measure.79
To substantiate its argument, the US initiated the legal restrictions as well as
the ‘rigorous regulatory constraints’ of gambling activities and domestic locations
to protect the public thereby imposing severe restrictions to their operations.80
Based on these constraints,Antigua contended that the US regulations damaged its
domestic gambling industry, which resulted in a significant reduction of gambling
operators.81
This case generated tremendous interest owing to the implications of its
outcome elsewhere. Questions therefore remain as to the ability of WTO
Members to regulate internet gambling and whether the results will challenge the
economic and political power in the WTO and if current sanctions provide
developing countries with sufficient leverage to enforce compliance with treaty
obligations.82
The US having indicated its intention to implement DSB recommendations
needed ‘a reasonable period of time to do so’83 but its failure to do so, resulted in a
determination via binding arbitration.84 In the interim, the US indicating
compliance, sought to withdraw their commitment in that sector;85 however, this
was rejected by the Compliance Panel.
As the US did not comply within a reasonable time, Antigua requested
authorization86 to suspend the application of concessions and related obligations
under the GATS andTRIPS87 Agreement.
Justice was clearly not served in this case, which has been on going since 2004
and at the date of publication has not reached an amicable resolution whereby an
authorization to retaliate was granted on 28 January 2013.88
79 DSU Art. 22.2.
80 Panel Report ¶ 3.30.
81 Casinocity, http://www.online.casinocity.com/jurisdictions (accessed 19 Jun. 2013). In 1999, An-
tigua had 119 Licenced internet gambling sites which has been reduced to forty-five registered
internet gambling operators as of 19 Jun. 2013.
82 Supra note 62, Kilby, 233.
83 DSU Art. 21.3(b).
84 DSU Art.e 21.3(c).
85 Article XXI GATS permits a Member to permanently withdraw from a specific commitment at
any time after three years have passed from the time the agreement was put into place.
86 DSU Art. 22.2.
87 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Annex IC 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
88 Appellate Body Compliance Panel found that the DSB recommendations were not fully
implemented. Case summary, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/
ds285sum_e.pdf.
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Being cognizant of the negative implications of trade retaliation, WTO
Members are aware that it is not a credible action from an economic perspective. It
is merely a persuasive tool. Furthermore, since this is an imperfect non-binding
remedy, challenges in the implementation were experienced by Antigua as they do
not bound any tariff concessions,89 neither do they have any service commitments
as in the case of the US.
Adversely, retaliation would produce a negative effect on Antigua owing to its
limited productive capacity and dependency on imports primarily from the US.
Any tariff increases will cause a trickle-down effect in increased domestic prices
with severe negative spill-off effects on the domestic market and consumers.
Considering this and the experience of the implementation problems of the
suspension of the GATS commitments in the US-Upland Cotton case90 and the
resultant fallout in foreign direct investment, emphasis was placed on the economic
implications as experienced in the EC-Bananas case.91
Additionally, the effective rationale of this decision must follow the rules and
procedures.92 However, in considering the challenges posed to developing
countries,93 the complaining party is entitled to move from the same sector or
same agreement when suspension in that particular sector is not practical or
effective.
A further examination of the EC-Bananas dispute reveals that the retaliation
of trade sanctions rotated and affected unrelated industries as sanctions were
imposed on paper, bath products, handbags, bed linens and batteries.94 As a
consequence, legal actions were brought for damages against the European Union
(EU) in the EU Courts,95 yet were not effective in securing compliance. Ecuador,
aware of the economic implications to its citizens, was compelled and opted not to
take any retaliatory action.
Despite all the mechanisms, compliance is less likely to be achieved especially
in situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from
the respondent.96 Owing to disparity between economic strength and influence,
under the WTO DSS, retaliation is considered as a measure of last and final resort
89 GATS Sector 10.D., ‘Sporting and Other Recreational Services,’ in the Schedule of specific
Commitments under the GATS (GATS/SC/2) (the ‘Antigua Schedule’).
90 DS/267 US-Upland Cotton.
91 DS/27 EC-Bananas.
92 In accordance with the DSU Art. 22.3.
93 DS/267 US-Upland Cotton.
94 O’Connor B, Remedies in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System – the Bananas and
Hormones Cases, 38 J.World Trade, 260 (2004).
95 Ibid., at 260.
96 Recourse to arbitration by the European Communities under Art. 22.6.
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in order to restore the commitments97 and to induce compliance with DSB
rulings.98
The security and predictability in this case were being jeopardized by the
persistent recalcitrance of the US.The decision by the Arbitrator of January 201399
signalled to the US that even a small-scale denial of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) can create some degree of political discomfort, which would presumably
cause this sector to pressure the US into compliance.
This decision is not subject to appellate review and therefore not mandatory
to adhere unconditionally as in previous rulings100 since these are generally agreed
by previous determinations in the interpretation and application.101 Furthermore,
the aggrieved Member would not have to produce detailed sector information to
prove the practicality and effectiveness.102
To ensure consistency, that the violation was ‘serious enough’103 to warrant
cross-sector agreement application, the ‘broader economic consequences’ and the
‘adverse effects’ were considered. Despite cross-agreement retaliations being
compounded with legal and policy issues, thus far in the WTO DSS,
cross-agreement retaliation has been invoked only three times.104
The volume of Antiguan exports to the US is around USD 4.5 million
annually, when contrasted with corresponding imports from the US is
approximately USD 180 million.This disproportionate trading relationship would
place the citizens of Antigua in difficult position and whilst suspension of trade
with the US will be negligible to the US economy, it would have devastating
effect on the Antiguan economy.105
Retaliation is diametrically opposed to Article 3.2 of the DSU, whilst it may
justify the security and predictability of the complaining member, it is
simultaneously targeting those sectors which will be affected by the retaliatory
measure and this is even less understood by those in the cross-agreement
segments.106 The degree of uncertainty of the effects or impact of retaliation thus
97 Article 22.4 DSU.
98 Article 22.3 DSU.
99 Pursuant to DSU Art. 22.7.
100 Jackson, Sovereignty.
101 Article 22.3 of the DSU.
102 DS/27 EC-Bananas III.
103 DSU Art. 22.3.
104 EC-Bananas III, US-Gambling and US-Upland Cotton.
105 US-Gambling Panel Report,WT/DS285/R, 10 Nov. 2004, ¶3.2.
106 Quoting from Malacrida n. 27 in relation to retaliation in the EC-Hormones Case – Edward
Morelend in relation to US Agriculture Reps urge Rotating products on Beef Hormone Re-
taliation list, 16 International Trade Reporter, 16, 662, French Glue reels from US Sanctions,
Agence France-Presse, 23 Jul. 1999 and in the EC-Bananas III case – Italian Chees gets caught in
grinder of Banana Dispute,Wall Street Journal, 1 Mar. 1999.
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makes it problematic with negative implications in the multilateral trading system
which promotes progressive liberalization.107
Clearly, there is a significant need for dispute resolution reform.The inherent
problem in the WTO system for enforcement procedures are too insignificant to
mandate a county like the US to adhere to the WTO when it is facing a weaker
economy. According to Darling, ‘this therefore has the potential for causing
systemic damage to the WTO process’108 and to the integrity of the WTO.
1.3 INTERNET GAMBLING LAWS IN THE US
The Internet has provided new opportunities for the gambling sector,109 and as
predicted, given the American public a voracious appetite for online gambling.110
The connotation of gambling has been imbued with social, religious and moral
implications,111 and in the US this is highly regulated pursuant to the individual
states’ laws.112 As such, internet gambling is illegal in all fifty states113 with a
number of federal measures designed to limit online gambling.The prohibition of
online gambling has been taken through a variety of legislative, executive and
judicial responses. On the legislative front, the US prohibits online gambling via
the Wire Act 1961,114 the Illegal Gambling Business Act 2006115 and the
Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Act (‘Travel
Act’) 1952.116 Despite these legal instruments, the 1990s saw the growth of
gambling websites at a meteoric rate.117 With the ease of online gambling, the
website operators moved away from the US for tax advantages establishing their
operations offshore, targeting primarily American citizens. The US federal
107 Malacrida R, Towards Sounder and Fairer WTO Retaliation: Suggestions for Possible Additional Procedural
Rules Governing Members’ Preparation and Adoption of Retaliatory Measures, 42 J.World Trade (2008).
108 Darling J, Gambling with Our Future: A Call for Needed WTO Dispute Resolution Reform as Illustrated
by the US-Antigua Conflict Over Online Gambling 42 George Wash. Intl. L. Rev., 381 (2010).
109 Kailus MP, Do Not Bet on Unilateral Prohibition of Internet Gambling to Eliminate Cyber-Casinos, U. Ill.
L. Rev. 1045 (1999).
110 Montpas SM, Gambling on-Line: for a Hundred Dollars, I Bet You Government Regulation Will Not Stop
the Newest Form of Gambling, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 163 (1996).
111 Carbajales NH, No More Bets: the United States Rolls the Dice One More Time Regarding International
Relations and Foreign Internet Gambling Services, 19 Tul. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 397 (2010–2011).
112 Lessani A, How much do you want to bet that the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 is not the
most effective way to tackle the problems of online gambling? (1998) The UCLA Online Inst. Cyberspace
L. & Policy Archive, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/alessani.html.
113 Rychiak RJ, Legal Problems with Online Gambling, Engage 36 (2005).
114 The Wire Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §1084 (2006).
115 The Illegal Gambling Business Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §1955 (2006).
116 The Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Act [hereinafter The
Travel Act] is codified at 18 U.S.C. §1952 (2006).
117 Supra note 109, Kailus.
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government sought to curb this growing trend which came with a depletion of
revenue from the US to other jurisdictions.
The US-Gambling dispute thus emerged from different regulatory
approaches118 to internet gambling from being morally persuasive to the necessity
to diversify an economy utilizing legally available trading options of the WTO.
The belief was that their cumulative effect was detrimental to the online gambling
industry owing to their discriminatory nature: Antigua contending that the US
was allowing domestic internet gambling operators.119
To examine whether the past and current US gambling laws have unjustifiably
discriminated against gambling service providers, the scope and nature of the US
laws are examined:
1) The Federal Laws:
a) The Wire Wager Act 1961;
b) The Travel Act 1952 (when read together with the relevant state laws); and
c) The Illegal Gambling Business Act 1970 (when read together with the relevant
state laws);
d) The Interstate Horseracing Act.
2) The State Laws:
a) Section 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Annotated Revised Statutes 1950;
b) Section 17A of Chapter 271 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts;
c) Section 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws; and
d) Section 76 -10- 1102(b) of the Annotated Utah Code.
Furthermore, during this discourse, other relevant legal instruments which
became critical in the Gambling case are reviewed.
1.3[a] Federal Laws
1.3[a][i] The Wire Act
The Wire Act of 1961120 is the first Federal Act which the Department of Justice
(DOJ) have interpreted to prohibit the supply of gambling services through ‘wire
communication facilities’ which criminalizes internet gambling. Of all the federal
statutes, the Wire Act is the principal enforcement mechanism over interstate
gambling transactions121 to be applied in the federal prosecution of activity
118 Lester L, Beating the Odds: Regulation of Online Gambling Stateside and Abroad, 28 J. Natl. Assn.
Admin. L. Jud. 621 (2008).
119 First written submission of Antigua ¶ 118.
120 The Wire Act of 1961 codified at 18 U.S.C. §1084.
121 Supra note 62, Kilby, 233 quoting Jenna F. Karadbil, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the
Proposed Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 413, 426 (2000).
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relating to internet gambling of executives from online casino companies.122 This
Act has been classified as a cumbersome prosecutorial device123 which remains
ambiguous.
According to the DOJ,The Wire Act prohibits ‘not only the act of gambling,
but also transmissions of any information that make it possible to gamble in the
first place’.124 Since this Act was enacted in 1961, it could not have been
specifically designed to address the legality of internet gambling125 but was used to
successfully prosecute Cohen and others126 who were operating gambling
websites. According to several commentators,127 the Wire Act has shortcomings
as it:
– ‘Applies to transmissions conducted over a wire, as opposed to wireless transmissions
thus transactions using a wireless router, are likely outside the scope of the Wire
Act’;128
– ‘The Act does not apply to individual betters/gamblers only to those ‘engaged in the
business of betting’;129 and
– ‘The Act has never been updated to address ambiguities in the law created by the
Interstate Horseracing Act’.130
In this format, the Wire Act prohibits the use of Mode 1 delivery of service in
the GATS by constituting a zero quota for one or several of these means of
delivery131 which limits the form of numerical quotas132 and a limitation in the
form of a quota133 as confirmed by the Appellate Body.134 According to the Panel,
any limitation on the means of cross-border delivery would reduce or nullify a
standing specific GATS Mode 1 commitment.135 Under Article XVI: 2,136 the
122 Nelson B., Regulation or Prohibition? The Troubled Legal Status of Internet Gambling Casinos in the
United States in the Wake of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 9 Texas Rev.
Ent. & Sports L. 39, 46 (2007).
123 Kilby, quoting Murawski MVC, The Online Gambling Wager: Domestic and International Implications of
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 441 (2008).
124 Supra note 62, Kilby.
125 Keller Bruce P, The Game’s the Same:Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 Yale L.J.
1569, 1577–1578 (1999).
126 Hartley H., Major Legislation on All Forms of Gambling Could Be Imminent, Offshore Gaming Assn.,
17 Dec. 2012; http://www.osga.com/wordpress/gambling-rumors/major-legislation-on-all-forms-of
-gambling-could-be-imminent.html.
127 Supra note 62, Kilby, 233; supra note 123, Murawski, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 39 (2008) and supra
note 122, Nelson, 39.
128 Supra note 123, Murawski.
129 Supra note 122, Nelson B, 39.
130 Supra note 62, Kilby, 233.
131 US-Gambling Report – Panel Report, paras 6.363, 6.367 and 6.370.
132 GATS Art. XVI:2(2).
133 GATS Art. XVI:2(c).
134 US- Gambling Appellate Body Report 265.
135 US-Gambling Panel report para. 6.286.
136 Article XVI:2(a) and (c) of the GATS.
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panel found that Members would be able to circumvent their commitments by
adopting restrictions to market access greater than those envisaged and thus ruled
that the Wire Act fell within the limitations to market access.137
The broad scope ‘gambling’ under the Wire Act conflicts with the
permissibility of internet gambling on a purely interstate basis.138 According to
Roysen,139 the main controversy is its failure to explicitly mention wagering on
games of chance, in addition to ‘sporting events’. The US Government has
consistently argued that the Wire Act applies to all types of internet gambling.
However, the judiciary has concluded that it does not prohibit non-sport internet
gambling.140 Additionally, the legislative history indicates that Congress only
intended to regulate sports gambling.This is further confirmed by the attempts to
amend the Act to include other forms of gambling. Therefore, the DOJ’s
interpretation of the Wire Act creates a greater conflict in terms of the degree of
the US violation of its WTO’s commitments.141
1.3[a][ii] The Travel Act
The Travel Act of 1952142 was drafted in an origin-neutral language and prohibits
the use of: ‘any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the
mail . . . to promote . . . or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment,
or carrying on, of any unlawful activity’.143
Whilst it does not specifically refer to wire communications, it has been
interpreted to apply to telephone communications.144 Grunfeld argues that this
law makes interstate travel related to gambling illegal. However, it is dependent on
gambling being illegal in the state where the activity in question is intended to be
committed as the Act applies to both internet and live gambling.145
137 Molfa M, US Legislation on Cross Border Gambling Violates the GATS: Has a New Era for Internet
Gambling Commenced? I Would Not Bet on It! 11 Intl. Trade L. Rev. 205 (2005).
138 Ibid.
139 Roysen Y., Taking Chances: The United States’ Policy on Internet Gambling and Its International
Implications, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 873 (2009).
140 Re Mastercard International Inc.
141 Grunfeld M, Don’t Bet on the United States Internet Gambling Laws: the Tension between Internet
Gambling Legislation and the World Trade Organization Commitments, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 439 (2007).
142 The Travel Act s. 1952(a) and (b) of Title 18 of the US Code.
143 18 U.S.C. §1952 (a)(3) (2006).
144 Supra note 139, Roysen.
145 Supra note 141, Grunfeld.
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1.3[a][iii] The IGBA
The Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA)146 sought to provide the Federal
Government with the authority to prosecute large gambling enterprises by
prohibiting the operation of illegal gambling businesses to curtail organized crime
and racketeering.The Act defined ‘illegal gambling’ as:
(1) a violation of the law of a state or political sub-division in which it is
conducted;
(2) involving five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct or own all or part of such business; and
(3) has been or remains a substantially continuous operation for a period
in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of USD 2,000 in any
single day.147
Similarly, this Act does not mention the use of wire facilities in gambling
specifically. Nevertheless, it has been extended to encompass internet gambling so
long as the online gambling operators come under the definition of an illegal
gambling business under the Act.148
The Travel Act and the IGBA discriminate between domestic and foreign
service suppliers to the extent that these two laws make international internet
gambling illegal on the federal level because they are illegal under state laws, but
do not prohibit the same actions on a purely intrastate basis.149 Furthermore, the
Travel Act does not specifically refer to wire communications, but has been
interpreted to apply to telephone communications and is therefore applicable to
internet gambling.150 Additionally, both the Travel Act and the IGBA were drafted
in an equally origin-neutral language and were both interpreted by the panel to
amount to a ‘zero quota’,151 which is prohibited by Article XVI:2. In contrast,
Matsushita et al., argue that this approach is incorrect from a legal and trade
liberalization perspective as it would be inconceivable for GATS to regulate
market access conditions.152 Furthermore, it would be regrettable to incite opaque
146 The Illegal Gambling Business Act s. 1955(a) and 9(b) of Title 18 of the U.S.C. Code.
147 18 U.S.C. §1955 (b)(1) (i)–(ii). The IGBA specifies that ‘gambling’ ‘includes but is not limited to
pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting
lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.’
148 Supra note 139, Roysen.
149 Supra note 141, Grunfeld.
150 Supra note 139, Roysen. It is plausible to conclude that the use of the internet ‘to facilitate an illegal
gambling enterprise . . . would violate the law’; Roysen quoting from Anthony N. Cabot, Federal
Gambling Law 119 (1999).
151 Irwin D & Weiler J, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS
285), 7 World Trade Rev. 71 (2008).
152 Matsushita M, Schoenbaum TJ & Mavroids PC, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and
Policy, 652 (Oxford U. Press 2006).
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protectionism with restrictions in the number of items under Article XVI of the
GATS.153
Whilst the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) was not a subject of complaint, as
a gambling legislation it became pivotal in the decision.
1.3[a][iv] The IHA
The IHA was enacted in 1978 ‘to regulate interstate commerce with respect to
wagering on horse racing’154 in response to the rising concern that interstate
wagering would lead to a loss of revenue for racetracks.155 It defines interstate off
track wagering as:
pari-mutuel wagers, where lawful in each state involved, placed or transmitted by an
individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media and accepted by an
off-track betting system in the same or other state.156
The term ‘electronic media’ includes internet transactions and exempts
domestic interstate providers from the federal statutes. However, it does not
provide the same exemptions for offshore providers.
The IHA underscores discrepancies within the US gambling laws thus was
found to be discriminatory because it exempts domestic suppliers of remote
gambling and betting services, contrary to the Chapeau of Article XIV.
1.3[b] State Laws
According to the US laws, a state is constitutionally empowered to legislate
gambling, and local gambling operators can take bets online.This has resulted in a
conflict between the federal and state governments on the legality of internet
gambling in the US.
The state laws157 challenged (pursuant to Article XVI GATS) in the
US-Gambling Case were directed at consumers of gambling who make a bet.
However, this was rejected by the panel as Article XVI: 2 (a) specifies ‘service
suppliers’ whilst ‘service operators’ are mentioned in Article XVI: 2(c).As such, the
limitations of these measures are not within the ambit of Articles XVI: 2(a) and/or
XVI 2 (c) and thus are not inconsistent with the US specific commitments.158
153 Ibid., p. 652.
154 15 U.S.C. §3001 (b) (2006).
155 Roysen quoting Cabot AN, Federal Gambling Law 119 (1999).
156 15 U.S.C. §3002 (3).
157 Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey and New York.
158 Wunsch-Vincent S, The Internet, cross-border trade in services, and the GATS: lessons from US-Gambling
5 World Trade Rev. 319 (2006).
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The AB determined that despite written submissions and exhibits, Antigua
had not established a prima facie case in relation to these laws.159 Since they were
not subjected to any further challenge, it is still uncertain whether the state
prohibitions on internet gambling violate WTO anti-discrimination provisions.
1.3[b][i] The UIGEA 2006
The AB held that the US shall modify the violations created by the IHA and bring
the measures into compliance.160 However rather than complying, the US
government strengthened its legislation161 and further complicated it162 by the
‘UIGEA’ in 2006.163 This Act relies heavily upon the government’s regulatory
power over the domestic financial services industry to constrain the flow of funds
to internet gambling firms.164 After unsuccessful attempts to modify the
aforementioned federal laws to eliminate online gambling, the next objective was
to target the methods of payment.The restriction of transactions165 was designed
to block or limit the flow of funds to internet gambling businesses.166 This in
essence bans financial institutions from transferring funds for bets in which
‘opportunity to win is predominately subject to chance’.167
The UIGEA does not make placing bets on the internet illegal,168 but it
generally prohibits persons who are ‘engaged in the business of betting or
wagering’ from knowingly accepting payments that involve participation of
another person engaged in ‘unlawful internet gambling’.169 Accordingly, unlawful
internet gambling is defined as being involved in betting, at least partly through
the internet, where that bet ‘is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law
in the State or tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received or
otherwise made’.170 It is primarily an enforcement mechanism which does not
alter any of the existing laws. On the contrary, the objective provisions and the
restrictions of international payments can cause serious impairments of
159 Panel Report ¶6.357 and AB report ¶149.
160 US – Gambling, Appellate Body Report ¶374.
161 Supra note 139, Roysen.
162 Carbajales NH, No More Bets: the United States Rolls the Dice One More Time Regarding International
Relations and Foreign Internet Gambling Services, 19 Tul. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 397 (2010–2011).
163 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1952 (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§5361–5367 (2006)).
164 31 U.S.C. §5364 (2006).
165 31 U.S.C. 5362 (7).
166 31 U.S.C. 5364 (a).
167 The Economist, At War with Lick: Is Poker a Game of Chance Or Skill, 10 Jul. 2010.
168 Rose NI, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, Gambling & the Law
(15 Jun. 1999).
169 31 U.S.C. §5363 (2006) and §5362 (10)(A).
170 Ibid.
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transactions to the scheduled sectors.171 This Act would therefore be in conflict
with the GATS as it restricts international transactions. However, additional
uncertainty is embedded here, as Article XI172 does not deprive Members from
regulating the usage of financial instruments, provided that they are consistent with
GATS.173
The UIGEA by its construction seeks to modify already existing gambling
laws by prohibiting internet gambling in states where non-internet gambling is
already illegal.174 Hence, if state law prohibits gambling in a physical casino, the
UIGEA indicates that internet gambling will be illegal there as well, unless the law
specifically allows for it.175 This exception therefore discriminates against foreign
operators as it provides an exception to operators in states with legalized
gambling.176
The UIGEA is construed as an internal regulation that acts primarily as an
external trade barrier closing off the US gambling and betting services market
from foreign service providers. It identifies public policy morality and money
laundering concerns as the legislative basis, and cites public policy (e.g., protection
of morality) as the grounds for exemption from its GATS commitments.177 The
panel report indicates that the enactment of the UIGEA contributed to the
inconsistency that the IHA created in terms of anti-internet gambling
environment.178 The panel therefore concluded that the US had failed to comply
with the AB ruling against it.179
One of the critical challenges in this case was that the US schedule of
concessions did not include a restriction to the cross-border supply of internet
gambling. It was therefore determined that gambling services are committed via
‘other recreational services’180 of the CPC classification. Subsequently, they could
171 US-Gambling Panel Report, ¶¶ 6.441–6.442.
172 Article XI of the GATS ‘Except under the circumstances envisaged in Art. XII, a Member shall
not apply restrictions on international transfers and payments.’
173 Panel Report §6.442.
174 Supra note 139, Roysen.
175 Ibid.
176 Carbajales NH, No More Bets: the United States Rolls the Dice One More Time Regarding International
Relations and Foreign Internet Gambling Services, 19 Tulane J. Intl. & Comp. L. 397 (2010–2011).
177 Bisset C, All Bets Are Off(Line): Antigua’s Trouble in Virtual Paradise 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.,
367 (2004).
178 Report of the Panel, Unites States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services,WTO/DS285/RW ¶6.135 adopted 30 Mar. 2007.
179 It is worth noting that the US Constitution Art.VI, §2 provides for self-executing treaties to have
a direct effect on US law, which require implementing legislation; this creates a problem as WTO
agreements are considered non-self executing, and thus not binding upon the US. By virtue of the
US Constitution, the decisions of the WTO DSU have no direct effect on US law and therefore
only the US Congress and the President can ensure compliance with WTO rulings.
180 US-Gambling Panel Report ¶6.134.
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not restrict internet gambling services originating in the US.181 As argued by
Wunsch-Vincent, the Scheduling Guidelines are facilitative and not normative or
mandatory.182 This in itself leads to ambiguity in regards to the specific provisions
of US law, which would establish the prohibitions on the remote supply of
gambling services.183 However, it was held that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and
the IGBA were in violation of the US’s commitments under Article XVI of the
GATS.
Furthermore, the AB asserted that these legislation limited market access to
‘service suppliers’, ‘service operation’ and ‘service output’ and thus constitute a
‘zero quota’ for one or more or all of those means of delivery184 therefore
violating Article XVI:1 and XVI:2(a) and (c).185 However, these laws were
provisionally justified by the ‘public morals’ exception under Article XIV.
Additionally, the AB approached the dispute by ‘not looking only at
restrictions on internet gambling, but rather at any restrictions on the free trade of
gambling services from Antigua’.186 Since the US had committed to keeping all
gambling services unrestricted, the AB deemed it non-compliant with Article XVI
of the GATS, even though the restrictions applied solely to internet gambling.187
The AB report also indicates that while the IHA188 allowed for internet
gambling, the US was in violation of the GATS owing to the fact that the IHA
allows certain forms of gambling, while other forms remain restricted.189
Analysis of the IHA and the UIGEA reveals that the allowance for intrastate
gambling is different thus discriminatory because these exemptions authorize only
discriminatory state regulations, as opposed to the other federal laws in question
which allow a state to enact non-discriminatory measures.190 Whereas these two
federal laws191 make an exception only for domestic, but not foreign, service
providers, then the federal law itself discriminates.
The inclusion of electronic media to the IHA further contradicts the UIGEA,
as it makes specific mention of the IHA, indicating that coverage of the UIGEA
does ‘not include any activity that was allowed under the IHA’.192 This
inconsistency is important for the US-Gambling dispute as the WTO has held that
181 Matsushita (p. 615).
182 Wunsch-Vincent S, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from US
–Gambling 5 World Trade Rev. 319 (2006).
183 US-Gambling panel Report quoting 18 U.S.C. §1081¶6.165.
184 Panel Report 6.363.
185 US-Gambling, Appellate Body Report para. 265.
186 Supra note 141, Grunfeld, 439.
187 Supra note 139, Roysen Y, 873.
188 AB Report, ¶373(d)(v)(c).
189 Supra note 139, Roysen.
190 Supra note 141, Grunfeld.
191 The IHA and the UIGEA.
192 31 U.S.C. §5362 (10)(D)(i)(2006).
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the existence of the IHA places the US in violation of international law.193 The
UIGEA was passed by the US Congress after the WTO decision, and rather than
bringing it into compliance, it enunciated that current federal laws allow for
purely intrastate internet gambling. The UIGEA does subtly acknowledge the
WTO dispute in its pronouncement as it does not affect how the IHA interacts
with other federal laws, which is the central issue in the WTO dispute.194
GATS commitments are legally binding, yet States seeking to enforce laws
against the prohibition of internet gambling face jurisdictional constraints over
their enforcement efforts, along with other challenges which are rooted in laws
which have not been updated to deal with the internet as discussed above.
The approach to interpretation becomes critical in this context as the US’s
approach was significantly different from the WTO. Jackson opines that the
interpretation of international courts is based on the ordinary meaning of the text
of the agreement, the object and purpose is merely ancillary,195 whereas, the US,
the ordinary meaning of the words is one factor taken into account as the primary
objective is to ascertain the meaning intended by the contracting parties.
Additionally, the US approach allows for a ‘rule of liberal interpretation’. However,
the interpretation of agreements by an authorized international body is binding on
the US and its courts.196
In examining the context of Antigua’s argument in relation to sub-section
10.D of the GATS Schedule ‘Other Recreational Services’,197 it was necessary to
interpret this according to customary rules198 in light of the VCLT 1969 to make
a determination on the word ‘sporting’. The AB concluded that by expressly
excluding sporting from this sub-section but not gambling and betting services,
the US failed to exclude gambling and betting services under the GATS as these
are covered by the Schedule.199
From another perspective, a number of commentators200 have expounded and
debated this argument from a jurisdictional point of view regarding the borderless,
interstate and international nature of internet gambling which has further
complicated the dispute.The named activities were carried on from Antigua which
193 Supra note 139, Roysen.
194 Supra note 141, Grunfeld.
195 Jackson JH, The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO: Insights on Treaty Laws and Economic Relations
322 (Cambridge U. Press 2000).
196 Jackson quoting the Draft Revised Restatement §325, note 5.
197 US-Gambling Panel Report ¶6.110 and 6.61.
198 Pauwelyn J, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go? 95 Am. J. Intl.
L (2001).
199 Carbajales NH, No More Bets: the United States Rolls the Dice One More Time Regarding International
Relations and Foreign Internet Gambling Services, 19 Tul. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 397 (2010–2011).
200 Kish SA, Betting on the Net: An Analysis of the Government’s Role in Addressing Internet Gambling,
(1999) 51 Fed. Commun. L.J. 449 (1999).
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had legalized internet gambling services,201 thus the US cannot exercise
jurisdictional authority to regulate activities which took place there.202 The supply
of electronic data through the internet from abroad cannot be stopped from
within the territory or state where the recipient is located. The US prohibitions
therefore cannot prevent operators established abroad from supplying cross-border
services to US recipients.This lack of jurisdiction, coupled with the Wire Act and
other measures do not prevent US residents from gambling online. Consequently,
this renders the US measures largely ineffective to protect public morals and/or
public order.
With its complex and contradictory nature, the US legislation creates
ambiguity as to the application of US federal gambling restrictions to internet
gambling.203 Contrary to US federal regulations, the individual states have the
autonomy to regulate gambling, which is evident in the UIGEA.204 This creates
the most significant conflict with the WTO rules and reveals the inherent
divergence of interest between state and federal concerns and the treaty
obligations.205
The possibility that other federal laws conflict with the US free trade
commitments further enmesh the tension in the current US law. Antigua’s claim
that the US legislation is ambiguous, that certain measures and their enforcement
discriminate between domestic service providers and foreign electronic gambling
suppliers206 is further exemplified by the expansive stance207 on the Wire Act.
Contentious provisions of the UIGEA make the stance of the US even less
tenable. Thus, the implications of free trade are at a crossroad with the current
internet gambling regulatory scheme which allows states to decide for themselves
against the US’s free trade commitments undertaken on the behalf of the country
as a whole.208
The scope of the domestic provisions pursuant to Articles VI, XIV and XVII
GATS is examined below. In doing so, the right to regulate domestically based on
national policy objectives and the balance of trade liberalization is critiqued.
201 Molfa M, US legislation on cross border gambling violates the GATS: has a new era for internet gambling
commenced? I would not bet on it! 11 Intl. Trade L. Rev. 205 (2005).
202 Ibid.
203 Wunsch-Vincent S, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from
US-Gambling 5 World Trade Review 319 (2006).
204 31 U.S.C. §5362 (10)(B) 2006.
205 Supra note 141, Grunfeld.
206 Ibid.
207 Wunsch-Vincent S, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from
US-Gambling 5 World Trade Rev. 319 (2006).
208 Ibid.
THE GATS AND INTERNET GAMBLING 479
1.4 PRINCIPLES OF THE GATS
This part evaluates the interconnectivities of the relevant provisions and the
resulting ambiguities by reference to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.209
The emphasis is on the scope of the US law specifically in relation to GATS
Articles VI, XIV, XVII and XVIII.
The GATS created several deficiencies,210 inter alia, the interpretation owing
to the embedded ambiguities in the interconnectivity of the GATS provisions
listed above.211 The barriers to trade in services are regulatory and reflected in the
framework of specific commitments based on the principle that trade in services
will be liberalized progressively.212 However, ambiguities relating to their
substance, scope and interaction213 create inherent complexity and have a unique
nature which have affected the overall balance in the disciplining of regulatory
measures.214
Services sector has expanded significantly in national and international
economies, and traditionally been dominated by the developed countries.215 This
expansion has also witnessed rapid growth in developing countries in terms of
output and employment216 resulting in significant trade investment flows.
The main principles of GATS encompass non-discrimination, market access
for foreign services and service suppliers. However, GATS has some structural
weaknesses such as lack of transparency; sector-specificity of the modalities; and
scheduling and generic rules.217 The problems created by the overlap and
inconsistency between national treatment and market access restrictions will
infringe national treatment provisions if they apply only to foreign service
providers as in the US-Gambling dispute.Accordingly, each Member in their initial
scheduled commitments can inscribe either (1) ‘none’; (2) ‘unbound’; or (3) ‘to
209 Group of Negotiating on Services, Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services:
Explanatory Note 3, 3 Sep. 1993, MTN.GNS/W/164 and Scheduling of Initial Commitments in
trade in services: Explanatory Note, Addendum, 30 Nov. 1993, MTN.GNS/W/164/Add.1
[hereinafter ‘1993 Scheduling Guidelines’].
210 Delimatsis P, Don’t Gamble with GATS – The Interaction between Arts VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII
GATS in Light of the US Gambling Case, 40 J.World Trade 1059 (2006).
211 Mavroidis PC, Highway XVI Re-Visited: the Road from Non-Discrimination to Market Access in GATS,
6 World Trade Rev. 1 (2007).
212 Article XIX GATS.
213 Tans S, The GATS Approach towards Liberalization: the Interaction between Domestic Regulation, Market
Access, National Treatment and Scheduled Commitments in the GATS, CTEI Working Papers #111
(2009) The Graduate Institute Geneva Centre for Trade and Economic Integration.
214 Delimatsis P, Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services: the Best Is Yet to Come, 19
European J. Intl. L. 365 (2008).
215 Chanda Rupa, GATS and Its Implications for Developing Countries: Key Issues and Concerns, DESA
Discussion Paper No. 25 ST/ESA/2002/DP.
216 Ibid.
217 Hoekman B, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in services.
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inscribe the actual limitation’. The schedule of concessions circumscribes the
contractual promise given by each WTO Member, yet these terms are not
specifically defined in the GATS thereby their interpretation must be made
pursuant to the VCLT 1969.218
The regulatory discipline of ArticleVI takes on a generally permissive view of
domestic regulation permitting Members to regulate services providing that these
regulations are administered in a ‘reasonable, objective manner’ and are not more
burdensome than necessary.219
Delimatsis argues that since regulatory intensity and diversity are manifold in
the services sectors, border measures are inapplicable. To this end, domestic
regulations are unduly burdensome and therefore are the most restrictive potential
barriers to trade in services.220 Mattoo concurs with this proposition and
accordingly notes that ‘one of the ironies of the GATS is the weak provisions
dealing with domestic regulations’ which become difficult to develop effective
multilateral disciplines without seeming to encroach upon national sovereignty and
unduly limiting regulatory freedom.221 Subsequently, domestic regulations can
impede international trade even if they do not expressly limit market access or
discriminate between foreign and domestic suppliers.222
The general exceptions of Article XIV allow for trade restrictions223 whereby
Members are allowed to impose laws necessary to protect public morals and to
maintain public order or to secure compliance with other GATS consistent laws
and regulations. These are applicable to both specific commitments and general
obligations. Provided that these measures are considered necessary and designed to
meet the objectives,224 they are justified as exceptions to GATS.225 However, these
measures must be in accordance with the conditions of the Chapeau226 and
therefore must not be applied in an arbitrary manner or constitute unjustified
discrimination in a disguised manner that would restrict trade.
218 Parks M, Market Access and Exceptions Under the GATS and Online Gambling Services, 12
South-Western J. Law & Trade Americas, 495 (2006).
219 Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat: Art. VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on
Domestic Regulations Applicable to All Services S/C/W/96 (1 Mar. 1999).
220 Delimatsis P, Due Process and ‘Good’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS – Disciplining Regulatory
Behaviour in Services through Article VI of the GATS, 10 J. Intl. Econ. L. 17 (2007).
221 Mattoo A, National Treatment in the GATS, Cornerstone Or Pandora’s Box? 31 J. World Trade 109
(1997).
222 Krajewski M, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: the Legal Impact of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy (Kluwer L. Intl. 2003).
223 Supra note 31, Leroux, 749.
224 Article XIV – these are not subject to scheduling in a Member’s Schedule of Commitments.
225 Article XIV(a)–(c).
226 The Footnote to Art. XIV provides that the public order exception may be invoked only where
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of society’s fundamental interest of society.
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The application of this article resulted in the interpretation of the object and
purpose of the Chapeau based on the relevance of the exceptional provisions of
Article XX of the GATT.227 Hence, the AB relied on the decisions and/or rulings
under the GATT to interpret the term ‘necessary’ in accordance with Article XX
of GATT, thus determining that the three federal measures228 at issue were
provisionally justified.229
In the US-Gambling, the issues of public morals and public order under
Article XIV(a) were adjudicated.230 The Panel concluded that as long as they are
not discriminatory: ‘Members should be given some scope to define and apply for
themselves the concepts of “public morals” and “public order” in their respective
territories, according to their own systems of scales of values.’231
Accordingly the burden of proof lies with the Member attempting to justify a
measure under exception clauses with positive evidence and not merely a general
assertion, that there is a prima facie case that necessitates the measure. Thus the
necessity test (established in the AB Report in Korea-Beef case),232 requires two
conditions.233 Additionally, the trade impact of the measure and whether or not
another WTO consistent measure was reasonably available may be challenged234 as
in the US-Gambling case.
Market access rule235 under Article XVI has been designed to regulate
domestic policies that restrict competition for foreign services and service
suppliers.236 These obligations curtail Members’ ability to impose quantitative
restrictions; albeit the exception clause enables national interest to override the
provisions of GATS.237
227 US- Gambling, Panel Report ¶6.448 Art. XX GATT – United States – Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2 and WT/DS4 (US-Gasoline), Report of the
Appellate Body Adopted 20 May 1996 s. IV.
228 The Illegal Gambling Business Act, The Wire Act and The Travel Act.
229 Article XIV(a).
230 US-Gambling, Appellate Body Report, ¶291.
231 US-Gambling Panel Report¶ 6.461.
232 Korea- Measures affecting Imports of Freshly Chilled and Frozen Beef,¶166, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (10 Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Korea-Beef].
233 The two elements are identified as ‘the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends
pursued by it’; and ‘the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce’.
234 ‘Proportionality test’. US-Gambling, Appellate Body Report ¶306.
235 The nature and scope of the market access obligations are defined in Art. XVI.1 of the GATS
which states that: ‘With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article
I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less
favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified
in its Schedule’.
236 King N & Kalupahana, Choosing between Liberalization and Regulator Autonomy Under GATS:
Implications for US-Gambling for Trade in Cross-Border E-Services. 40 Vanderbilt J. Transitional L., 1189
(2007).
237 GATS Art. XIV; Scheduling Guidelines.
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Notably, the US had undertaken full market access under Mode 1, but the
measures which were maintained by the US denied any access to its market for
that sub-sector and cross-border mode of supply.238
The US commitment is ambiguous because the GATS schedule does not
explicitly mention gambling and certainly not internet gambling.239 Additionally,
Article XVI is unclear in relation to the commitment of full market access of a
particular sector and other regulatory measures are not listed in Article XVI: 2.240
The level of uncertainty belies the fact that the list under Article XVI: 2 is
exhaustive as it covers all measures which are considered as market access
restrictions.
According to Delimatsis,241 the complex issues of Article XVI: 2 led the AB
to reject the narrow argument by the US on the limitations of this article with
reference to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines242 and in accordance with the
interpretation of the VCLT 1969.243 The AB accepted that a total prohibition or a
zero quota is a quantitative measure inconsistent with sub-section (a) of this
article.244 Additionally, a similar conclusion was reached in relation to sub-section
(c) covering service operations and service output.245 In contrast, some
commentators have criticized this approach because it causes confusion and
impedes on national regulatory autonomy.246
Importantly, if the measures are not within the six definitions under Article
XVI they are not prohibited market access restrictions, even though they restrict
market access.247 While the AB recognized the problem of distinguishing between
quantitative and qualitative limitations, it declined to draw the line in this case.248
The application of quantitative limitations can constitute a de facto breach of
national treatment obligations as such measures could be non-discriminatory and
still serve an illegitimate purpose of imposing maximum quantitative limitations
which are designed to restrict trade and competition.This can be called the ‘effect
principle’ in determining whether the national measure impeded market access
238 Supra note 31, Leroux, 749.
239 Irwin DA & Weiler J, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS
285), 7 World Trade Rev. 71 (2008).
240 Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting held on 9 Jul. 2002, S/C/M/54.
241 Supra note 220, Delimatsis.
242 GATT 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.
243 VCLT Art. 32.
244 Appellate Body Report US-Gambling ¶227–233.
245 Supra note 210, Delimatsis, 1059.
246 Pauwelyn Rien Ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and
GATTS, 4 WTR (2005); Krajewski, Playing by the Rules of the Game? Specific Commitments after US
Gambling and Betting and the Current Negotiations, Leg. Issues Econ. Integration 32 (2005); Ortino,
Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US-Gambling: a Critique J. Intl. Econ. L.
9 (2006).
247 Furthermore, the extensions of the definitions are also exhaustive. US–Gambling Panel Report
¶6.325 and 6.341.
248 Appellate Body Report, US–Gambling ¶248.
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and hinders international trade. However, despite specific commitments
guaranteeing market access, Members are under obligation to treat all ‘like’ services
and service suppliers equitably.
The national treatment provision of Article XVII is not limited to domestic
regulations but for the committed sectors and applies ‘in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services’ within the scope of GATS.Thus, this provision is
necessary to discipline the use of domestic measures regarding the trade in
services.249
Furthermore, Article XVII of the GATS explicitly incorporates the de facto
doctrine to ensure that Members’ measures are accorded the same regulatory
treatment with equitable and competitive conditions,250 which prohibits
discrimination on a de jure or de facto basis.251
The panel in US-Gambling applied judicial economy and did not assess the
Article XVII claims; therefore, the AB did not interpret this provision252 leaving
some of the key elements of the non-discrimination clauses of GATS undecided.
This is a result of the fact that the AB only has the power to uphold, modify or
reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.253
Trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict,254 the most important
distinction being between government intervention with ‘market access
restrictions’ and ‘domestic regulation’.The legal consequence of these two can be
identified by the provisions of GATS as both being prohibitive. However, domestic
regulations are only prohibited when they are discriminatory or more burdensome
than necessary.255 If commitments are made, market access restrictions are, in
principle, prohibited unless justified under explicit exceptions. In contrast,
domestic regulation is subject to broad regulatory autonomy and, as a rule, violates
GATS only when it discriminates against imports.256 Accordingly, the AB ignored
the delicate balance between market access and domestic regulation. Nevertheless,
249 Narlikar A, Daunton M & Stern RM, The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization 171
(Oxford U. Press 2012).
250 Supra note 31, Leroux, 749.
251 Article XVII of GATS, paras 2 and 3.
252 The application of judicial economy was articulated in US – Shirts and Blouses (Appellate Body
Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India
(US – Shirts and Blouses) pp. 17–18) and qualified in Australia – Salmon (Appellate Body Report,
Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia –Salmon) ¶223) in which the AB
considered that a panel only needs to address the claims which must be considered to resolve the
matter of the dispute.
253 Supra note 31, Leroux.
254 Supra note 246, Pauwelyn, 131.
255 Ibid.
256 Supra note, Pauwelyn.
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Antigua did not appeal the AB’s reversal of the panel’s findings on the state and
federal laws which were contrary to Article XVI:2 of the GATS.257
While GATS does not explicitly regulate the provisions of market access and
domestic regulation, an examination of Article XVI and Article VI implies a
certain degree of overlap as Articles VI:1 and XVI both have ‘general application’
in relation to trade in services and market access restrictions.258 Thus both
provisions would seem to cover certain market access restrictions, or decisions
pursuant thereto, that are already covered by Article XVI of GATS.259
At the centre of the Gambling dispute is the relationship between Article XVI
and paragraph 5 of Article VI which are ‘mutually exclusive’ as these provisions
were deemed to be consistent.260 Fundamentally, by undertaking full market access
or full national treatment commitment, Members shall not apply measures that
would be inconsistent with the provisions of these articles261 albeit they maintain
the right to regulate within the parameters of Article VI of the GATS.262
Nevertheless, the Panel in the US-Gambling case distinguished these two
articles as:
Measures that constitute market access limitations within the meaning of Article XVI and
which, unless scheduled must be eliminated, are to be distinguished from measures that
impose qualification requirements and procedures, …, which can be maintained so long as
they do not constitute ‘unnecessary barriers to trade in services’ pursuant to the criteria
contained in ArticleVI:5.263
Arguably, the demarcation between Articles VI and XVI remains opaque in
the WTO jurisprudence.264 The AB did not specify the relationship between these
two provisions: ‘it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to draw, in the
abstract, the line between quantitative and qualitative measures’.265 However, these
can be distinguished as Article XVI covers quantitative limitations and maximum
ceilings whereas; Article VI deals with regulatory measures of a qualitative
character and minimum requirements.266 According to Wunsch-Vincent, this
257 Appellate Body Report – US–Gambling ¶ 256.
258 GATS Art.VI:1–3.
259 Supra note, Pauwelyn.
260 Panel Report ¶6.28.
261 Panel Report ¶6.311.
262 Panel Report ¶6.316.
263 Panel Report ¶6.303.
264 Supra note 245, 1059.
265 Appellate Body report, US–Gambling ¶250.
266 Supra notes, Pauwelyn and Delimatsis.
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confusion amounted to a zero quota and not a qualitative regulation.267 This
ambiguity was also articulated by the EU and Japan.268
The US measures were imposed on consumers rather than service suppliers or
operators.269 The ‘impact’ of such measures or prohibition is as important as on
whom they are imposed.While the measures may be imposed on the consumers,
the effect of the measure is directly related to the market access for service
providers. Since such measures have the effect of distorting market access and
competition, they are discriminatory.
The combination of Articles XVI and XVII establishes the primary objective
of the GATS.270 However, there is a complete overlap in the scope of application
of Article XVI (market access) and Article XVII (national treatment), which are
not mutually exclusive.271 Concomitantly, GATS restricts the right of a Member
to impose either trade distorting quantitative limits on service suppliers or
qualitative regulations that cause discrimination against foreign services or
suppliers on the basis of the origin of the service or the nationality of the service
supplier.
This division was clearly evident as the US gambling laws could in theory be
both market access restrictions and simultaneously discriminate against foreign
suppliers of gambling services as compared with ‘like’ US suppliers of gambling
services. The Panel examined the US gambling laws solely based on
discrimination, not pursuant to Article XVII, but pursuant to the Chapeau of the
Article XIV exception. On the contrary, even if the US gambling laws were found
to be non-discriminatory pursuant to Article XVII, this would not preclude them
as a violation of Article XVI. Hence, even if a measure is justified as
non-discriminatory, it can still violate Article XVI as some measures may conform
to Article XVII but still violate Article XVI.272 This is manifestly dichotomous.
The relationship between Article XVI and Article XVII is not explicit except
for an oblique reference in Article XX.2:
Measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in the column
relating to Article XVI. In this case the inscription will be considered to provide a
condition or qualification to Article XVII as well.
267 Wunsch-Vincent S, The Internet, Cross Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from US
Gambling, 5 World Trade Rev. (2006).
268 The European Communities and Japan were third parties in this dispute during the appellate
decision.
269 Appellate Body report, US-Gambling ¶107.
270 For example, the progressive liberalization of trade in services by eliminating or restricting
domestic regulations that impede market access and/or competition.
271 Supra note, Pauwelyn. Art. XX:2 of GATS provides that ‘measures inconsistent with both Arts XVI
and XVII shall be inscribed in the column relating to Art. XVI’. In this case, the inscription will
be considered to provide a condition or qualification to Art. XVII as well.
272 Ibid.
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Article XX:2 protects Members from unintentional commitments on national
treatment in the absence of any inscriptions to the contrary in Members’
schedules.273 The Scheduling Guidelines also present a degree of difficulty in
establishing what exactly has been committed.274 The list is exhaustive and
includes measures which may also be discriminatory according to the national
treatment standard. Accordingly, measures which violate national treatment
obligations and require scheduling under Article XVII, would also need to be
scheduled under Article XVI if the market access obligation extends beyond the
obligation not to maintain or adopt the measures in the list of paragraph two.275
Thus, all measures falling under any of the categories listed in Article XVI:2 must
be scheduled, whether or not such measures are discriminatory according to the
national treatment standard of Article XVII. Leroux concludes that market access
and national treatment disciplines complement each other in ensuring real and
effective access of a Member to a committed service sector.276
Thus while Article XVI requires discrimination to be considered on a
case-by-case basis whether de jure or de facto, Article XVII only focus on the
establishment of a formal criterion.277
The notable differences between Articles VI, XVI and XVII therein relate to
the positive function for national treatment and domestic regulation versus the
negative function of the market access provisions.Accordingly, the characteristic of
GATS is considered to be hybrid as some obligations apply to measures that affect
trade in services, whilst the application of others is subjected to specific
commitments.278
Arguably, these articles remain to be ‘the thorniest systemic issue in the GATS
today’,279 considering that market access and national treatment are the trade
restrictions targeted by liberalization negotiations and commitments, while
domestic regulation encompasses all others that are neither market access
limitation nor a de jure or de facto national treatment violation.280
The analysis of Articles VI, XIV, XVII and XVIII reveals the sensitive nature
and complexity of scheduling specific commitments and the ambiguities they
273 Supra note, Delimatsis.
274 Mavroidis PC, Highway XVI Re-Visited: the Road from Non-Discrimination to Market Access in GATS
6 World Trade Rev. 1 (2007).
275 Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS, Cornerstone Or Pandora ’S Box? 31 J. World Trade 109
(1997).
276 Supra note 31, Leroux.
277 Regan DH, A Gambling Paradox:Why An Origin-Neutral ‘Zero-Quota’ Is Not a Quota Under GATS
Art. XVI 41 J.World Trade 1311 (2007).
278 Supra note 31, Leroux.
279 Supra note 210, Delimatsis, 1059.
280 Marchetti JA & Mavroidis PC, What Are the Main Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk
about Revolution, 5 European Bus. Org. L. Rev. 548 (2004).
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entail.281 On a fundamental level, there is uncertainty regarding the exact scope
and contours of central provisions of GATS and their relationship with each
other.282
The hybrid character of the GATS revolves not only around
non-discrimination and reduction of trade barriers but also the right to conduct –
via market access and disciplines – national policies. Because of this, the objects
and purposes are supported by different interpretative results.283 In accordance
with the commitments under the provisions of GATS, any measure which affects
the supply of services must be non-discriminatory284 and any measure meeting
one of the six specific definitions of market access restrictions285 is prohibited
unless they are justified under Article XIV.286
1.5 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND SANCTIONS
The analysis of the US-Gambling dispute necessitates a brief discussion regarding
the roadblocks, which hinder remedies and their enforcement. Although the
WTO self-describes its decisions as binding upon all Members, these are merely
declaratory.287 So far, available remedies288 have often proven to be ineffective289
as also evidenced in the US-Gambling case.290 The DSB therefore may construct
remedies that are highly persuasive, yet difficult to enforce because it has no means
of forcing countries to adhere to its recommendations.291
The WTO has had quite an impressive record of settling disputes, with
currently 492 disputes in its books.292 Approximately 4.5% reached the pinnacle of
authorization of trade retaliation,293 remarkably, twenty-four of these requests for
consultation were under the GATS with four cases294 reaching the apex of the
281 Supra note 222, Krajewski.
282 Adlung R, Services Negotiations in the DOHA Round: Lost in Flexibility? 9 J. Intl. Econ. L. 865
(2006).
283 Supra note 222, Krajewski, 59.
284 Article XVII of GATS.
285 Article XVI of GATS.
286 Supra note 246, Pauwelyn, 169.
287 Legal Affairs Div. & the Appellate Body World Trade Organization. A Handbook on the WTO
Dispute Settlement System (2004) 2 88 CUP Cambridge.
288 As discussed previously, these are limited to settlement, withdrawal of the measure, compensation
and retaliation.
289 Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and Dispute Settlement Body Recommendation
and Rulings §7.1.
290 Supra note 34, Pauwelyn, 336.
291 Codd KB, Betting on the Wrong Horse: the Detrimental Effect of Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling
Dispute on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 49 William & Mary L. Rev. 941
(2007).
292 WTO disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (accessed 27 Apr
Sep. 2015).
293 Ibid.
294 EC-Bananas, EC-Hormones, US-Upland Cotton and US-Gambling.
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DSS. Remarkably, retaliation proved ineffective in two of these cases295 as the
prospect of smaller Members to enforce their rights on dominant Members with
stronger economies was unrealistic and counterproductive.296
The constitution of the WTO limits the jurisdiction of the DSB: defending
party can only invoke those rules by which both parties are bound; and
recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided for in the covered agreements. In order to enforce other rules
or proposed recommendations, a WTO panel would require expanded
jurisdiction.297 The limited jurisdiction of the panels has thus led to unjustified
restrictions as the strict requirements imposed for amendments to the treaty have
been wrongly invoked as an obstacle to allowing inter se modifications to the treaty.
This constitutional blockage leaves most WTO Members without recourse to
enforceable legal redress and justice.298
To date several proposals for the reform of the WTO dispute settlement have
been put forward. It is imperative to evaluate the feasibility of some of them with a
view of improving the remedy regime for smaller economies.299
Currently, the DSU allows for compensation300 as an alternative to retaliatory
measures.301 In order to eliminate the ineffective remedies of optional
compensation and sanctions a more favourable remedy would be a mandatory
compensation.302 The existing DSM compensation procedures only permit
reparations for prospective relief as determined by the panel.This measure allows
the Member to maintain the inconsistent protection for their domestic industry
during the panel and appellate stages of the dispute. A limited relief therefore
would be an interim measure or preventative measure303 to avoid the irreparable
damage to the injured Member during the judicial phase and exercised according
295 EC-Bananas and EC-Hormones.
296 Darling JB, Gambling with Our Future: A Call for Needed WTO Dispute Resolution Reform as
Illustrated by the US-Antigua Conflict Over Online Gambling, 42 Geo.Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 381 (2010).
297 WTO Agreement Art. X:1. Any legal reform has to go through the Ministerial Conference. The
provisions for amendments are explicitly provided by either consensus or a two-thirds majority of
the WTO Members at the Ministerial Conference.
298 Van den Borght K, Justice for All in the Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization? 39
Georgia J. Intl. & Comp. L. 787 (2010–2011).
299 Bronckers M & Van den Broek N, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving Remedies in the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 8 J. Intl. Econ. L. 101–126 (2008); supra note 298,Van den Borght;
and Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding
TN/DS/W/& (9 Oct. 2002); WTO Document, TN/DS/W23 and TN/DS/W/49 submitted by
Mexico.
300 Article 22.1 DSU.
301 Report of Panel, EEC – Restrictions on the Imports of Dessert Apples, BISD 36S/93 (L/6491),
adopted 22 Jun. 1989.
302 Darling JB, Gambling with Our Future: A Call for Needed WTO Dispute Resolution Reform as
Illustrated by the U. S. –Antigua Conflict Over Online Gambling, 42 George Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 381
(2010).
303 Article 21.5 – Panel in Australia – Subsidies Provided to Procedures and Exporters of Automotive
Leather WT/DS126/RW (21 Jan. 2000).
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to the UN model304 especially to cover the period until the withdrawal of the
measure in breach of the WTO obligation.
This differs from the current compensation system, which limits recovery to
the damage the applicant country has suffered subsequent to the date of expiration
of the reasonable time period the panel provides the violating country to come
into compliance.305 The proposed remedy would actually help a country recover
an amount equal to the harm it has suffered.
The removal of the discretion which countries have over compensation
request would be significant in addressing the inequality in the system and
providing a true remedy.306 After the AB determined the required amount of
compensation, the respondent should be required to reduce its tariffs in
accordance with the panel or AB’s determination as to the sectors and goods most
likely to actually help compensate the aggrieved applicant. Under the proposed
structure, the DSB would determine the amount of damage already suffered and
the annual potential damage likely to be suffered as a result of the inconsistent
measures.
Past disputes307 indicate that compensation often produce compliance and has
proven to be more practical in lieu of retaliation after the expiration of the
reasonable time period. Previous compensatory arrangements308 have proven to be
a viable solution. After all, the concept of financial compensation has been
enshrined in public international law and jurisprudence.309
Guidance on reform proposals on non-compliance can be taken from the US
domestic laws relating to the application of punitive damages where the courts can
award punitive damages where an individual has demonstrated ‘reckless
indifference to the rights of others and conscious action in a deliberate disregard of
304 Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding
TN/DS/W/& (9 Oct. 2002).
305 Supra note 34, Pauwelyn, 335.
306 O’Connor B, Remedies in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System-the Bananas and
Hormones Cases 38 J. World Trade 245 (2004). O’Connor has inferred that any change in the
system of sanctions must take the basic principles of fairness and justice into consideration with a
radical review of the rules for calculating nullification and impairment of the recognition that
some members have no ‘leverage’ over others in trade terms.
307 Mutually acceptable solution on Modalities for Implementation, Japan Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WT/DS8/20, WT/DS10/20 WT/DS11/18 (12 Jan. 1998); Notification of Mutually
acceptable Solution, Turkey –Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WT/DS34/14 (19 Jul. 2001); Agreement Under Art. 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States
–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from
Korea, WT/DS202/18 (31 Jul. 2002); Notification of a Mutually Satisfactory Temporary
arrangement, United States –s. 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,WT/DS160/23 (26 Jun. 2003).
308 Grosse R-K. A Pirate of the Caribbean? the Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. Intl.
Econ. L. 313 (2008) indicating that the US negotiated and concluded compensatory agreements
with the EC (EU), Canada, India, Japan and other interested WTO third-party members to this
dispute.
309 United States –s. 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,WT/DS160/23 (26 Jun. 2003).
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them’.310 Furthermore, DSU Article 22.4 requirement that sanctions be equivalent
to the ‘level of nullification or impairment’ need not be an absolute bar to punitive
damages.311 The WTO could impose punitive sanctions in the determination of
harm. The DSB would be required to articulate clearly how the degree of
sanctions selected served to induce compliance with the breached rule.312
According to Pauwelyn, total compliance is not possible given the current
instruments available and thus to achieve this ambitious goal would be meagre.313
Accordingly, the WTO must strengthen its mechanisms by punitive sanctions
which would allow the WTO to further exploit and bridge the gap between
actual damage incurred and the appropriate remedy that would ensure no
repetition of the unwanted behaviour in the future.314 Punitive sanctions would
force non-complying nations to account for the cost they impose by weakening
the integrity of the system as a whole.
Davey’s reform proposals particularly in scenarios such as the US-Gambling
case are also apt.315 He suggests substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu
of suspension of concessions; retroactivity so as to induce compliance within the
reasonable period of time and an adjustment to the mechanism to increase the
level of sanctions over a period of time.
Evidently, and already in existence are fines and other forms of mandatory
compensation in public international law316 which have been proposed in the
GATT.317 This provides direct reparations for economic injury suffered whilst
inducing compliance and is more congruent with public international law and
introduces a degree of fairness.318 To ensure that the Antigua gambling industry
benefits from this proposed reform, the cost of non-compliance should be applied
directly to the injured industry by means of safeguards and trade remedies to
prevent further disruption.
310 Restatement (Second) of Torts §908 cmt. B (1977).
311 Williams MR, Pirates of the Caribbean (and beyond): Developing a Remedy for WTO Noncompliance, 41
George Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 503 (2009–2010).
312 Ibid.
313 Pauwelyn J, Remedies in the WTO: First Set the Goal, Then Fix the Instruments to Get There, in WTO
Law and Process (Mads Andenas & Federico Ortino eds, BIICL 2005).
314 Mavroidis P, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 European J.
Intl. L. 763 (2000).
315 Davey W, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 Cornell Intl. L.J. 119 (2009).
316 Bronkers M & Van den Broek, quoting from Draft Articles on Responsibility for internationally
Wrongfully Acts, adopted by teh International Law Commission at its 53rd session (September
2001), Supplement No. 10. (A/56/10) Ch. IV.E.1.
317 Bronkers M & Van den Broek, quoting from the report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal
Amendments to the General Agreement, COM.TD/F/4 (4 Mar. 1966).
318 Bronckers M & Van den Broek N, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving Remedies in the
WTO Dispute Settlement, in Reform and Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 8 J. Intl.
Econ. L. 101 (2005).
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Bronckers et al. suggested that developing countries should opt for financial
compensation as the preferred improvement to the remedies conundrum rather
than continuing to support various options that are unlikely to yield diplomatic
consensus.319 Additionally, the calculation of the level of nullification or
impairment should be from as early as the date of the imposition that the measure
was found inconsistent with WTO rules.320 This would allow for an incentive for
compliance and further discourage attempts to prolong the implementation
period.
The value, legitimacy and integrity of the WTO are dented if obligations
therein cannot be enforced when one of the signatories fail or choose not to
comply with them.As such, the US response in the Gambling dispute undermines
the WTO regime as well as the rights and obligations of its Members under the
GATS.
Sanctioning as a remedy is rife with inequality, as the weaker countries are
unable to utilize it effectively. Without an effective implementation and
enforcement mechanism, the obligation to comply with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB will be null and void if the voluntary nature of
compliance remains.
Currently, since monetary compensation is dependent upon compliance by a
non-compliant member, it has the potential to threaten the long-term viability
of an effective dispute settlement mechanism. Following the outcome of
the US-Gambling case, one can assume that prospective remedies discourage
immediate or timely compliance.The determination of the retaliatory phase is not
definitive as to whether or not the intention is to rebalance concession, coerce
compliance or to punish recalcitrant respondents.321
The ineffectiveness of conventional remedies is one of the problems faced by
small island states, which affect their performance in the WTO DSS. The
suspension of IPR potentially provides them not only with leverage but also with
difficulties, as it has proven difficult to convince a major power to comply with
WTO decisions.
To handle the legal aspects of the retaliatory suspension of TRIPS obligations
and to avoid the domestic legal and technical difficulties which would lead to
improved compliance, Antigua established a select committee to oversee the
implementation process.322 The seven-member ‘WTO Remedies Implementation
319 Ibid.
320 WTO Document, TN/DS/W/23 and TN/DS/W/49, both submitted by Mexico.
321 An analysis of Arts 3.7 and 3.3 of the DSU when read together seeks to ‘secure a positive
solution to a dispute’ between Members as promptly as practicable.
322 Cana News, 19 Jul. 2013 ‘Antigua - WTO Government appoints select committee as despite
continues with over internet gaming’,http://feeds.feedblitz.com/_/26/43753226/prorsscan.
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Committee’ (RIC) is responsible for directing the government’s reciprocal plan to
suspend selected US IPR to the tune of USD 21 million per year. However, to
date, no progress has been made.
1.6 CONCLUSION
In today’s inter-connected WTO trade regime, certain violations may have an
impact on the legally protected interest of many or even all WTO Members who
are entitled to invoke their rights via the DSU.323 An efficient rule-based system
needs an adjudication that is independent, efficient, fair, consistent and respected.
However, there exists a degree of imbalance between smaller economies and
the major players. This is exemplified by the limited enforcement methods
available.To nullify this, mandatory, rather than the existing voluntary compliance
would ensure adherence.
The extensive temporal condition of this case and the expectations of a quick
and decisive outcome proved illusory and instead of an immediate and
comprehensive victory, the case has become a time-consuming battle with Antigua
showcasing great resilience and dexterity of a small state under stress.324 Despite
Antigua framing the case as one of fairness in the international system which
filtered through all of the legal remedies available via the WTO DSM, the US
abrogated on one of the fundamental elements of fairness in the international
system under the guise of domestic security and social protectionism.325
The US-Gambling dispute was the first to present these arguments relating to
Part III of the GATS to the DSB, thus addressing the scope of the agreement,
scheduling of specific commitments, market access, national treatment, most
favoured nation treatment and general exceptions.The decisions of the panel and
the AB provided guidance on several key elements; whilst some provided a degree
of clarification, others created confusion and rejected legal clarity.326 Thus the
intended scope of the regulatory measures remains unclear.
Clearly, whilst the GATS provisions were fairly elaborate, there are lacunas in
the agreement as illustrated above. The deference shown towards the regulations
and flexibility in the application of the conditions under US laws and GATS
Articles should be understood and interpreted in light of the particular facts and in
the context of this dispute.
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